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Abstract
This paper revisits the early time series estimates of currency unions on trade from an
historical perspective using a dynamic gravity equation and by conducting in-depth case
studies of currency union breakups. The early large estimates were driven by omit-
ted variables, as many currency union exits were coterminous with warfare, communist
takeovers, coup d’etats, genocide, bloody wars of independence, various other geopoliti-
cal travesties, or were predated by trade collapses. Static gravity estimates are found to
be sensitive to controlling for these omitted variables, while a dynamic gravity specifi-
cation implies that currency unions do not increase trade.
JEL Classification: F15, F33, F54
Keywords: Currency Unions, Trade, Dynamic Gravity, Decolonization
Special thanks to Chris Meissner, Kadee Russ, and Colin Cameron for their feedback,
and I am also indebted to Alan Taylor, Gabe Mathy, Nick Zolas, and Ju Hyun Pyun for
commenting on earlier drafts. The idea for this paper emanated out of courses taught by
Alan Taylor, Chris Meissner, and Robert Feenstra, and I benefited from discussions with
all three. I would also like to thank Andrew Rose for providing all of his data available
on-line, making it easy for others to build on his work – the mark of a true scholar. All
errors remain my own.
A key policy decision for many nations is the question of whether or not to join a
currency union (CU). Hence, it is not surprising that a large body of research in Inter-
national Macro in recent years has revolved around the impact of CUs on trade.1 What
is surprising, however, is the magnitude of the measured increase, as Rose (2000), Glick
and Rose (2002), Barro and Tenreyro (2007), and Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002)
have found that CUs increase trade on a 3-fold, 2-fold, 7-fold and 14-fold basis, with at
least another 70 papers finding a large and significant impact. A recent example in this
literature is Melitz, Helpman, and Rubinstein (2008), which confirmed that the impact
of CUs on trade is surprisingly large, and robust to various bias-correcting estimation
methods.2 Given the importance of trade for development, these findings imply that the
impact on trade should be an important consideration in assessing the welfare benefits
of joining, or leaving, a currency union. And so a technocrat on the European periphery
– such as in Greece – could be forgiven for fearing that leaving the Euro would have
have a large negative effect on trade and thus welfare.
Yet, since the Euro’s inception, it has become clear that the larger estimates of the
Rose Effect—named for the discoverer of the puzzling, enormous apparent effect of CUs
on trade—did not seem to explain European trade patterns. Neither Berger and Nitsch
(2008) nor Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009) found any effect of the Euro on trade,
while Havranek’s (2010) meta-analysis found that the mean impact of the Euro on trade
was 3.8% versus over 60% for earlier non-Euro episodes. Moreover, Havranek found
systematic evidence of publication bias for the Euro studies, while several more recent
studies have found little-to-no effect.3
One possibility is that the differing results may reflect the declining importance
of currency unions in an era of ATMs, internet banking, credit cards, and electronic
transactions.4 While technological innovations in moving money internationally may
well have reduced the trade impact of currency unions, the evidence presented here sug-
gests that the earlier large estimates are not robust to altering estimation techniques
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or controlling for various omitted variables. Many scholars, including Rose himself,5
have expressed doubt about the earlier large estimates of the CU effect, and there have
also been many insightful critiques of the early estimates of common currencies on trade.
These include studies by Persson (2001), Nitsch (2005) on currency union entries, Berger
and Nitsch (2005), Bomberger (2003), Bun and Klaassen (2007), and Baranga (2009)
which succeed in reducing the size of the impact, increasing the error bounds, or elim-
inating the effect altogether for select subsamples or for later time periods (i.e., Nitsch
[2005] for entries, Klein [2005] for dollarization episodes, and Baranga [2009] arrives at
a small positive point estimate with an IV for a later time period than the Glick-Rose
dataset). Yet, to-date there has yet to be a full accounting for why the early time series
estimates of CUs on trade were so deceptively large for the entire Glick and Rose –
henceforth GR – (2002) dataset.
The gravity literature has generally employed “static” gravity models to ascertain the
impact of currency unions on trade flows using panel data sets, although trade scholars
have long known that dynamics are important in trade. This paper follows Bomberger
(2003), Nitsch (2005), Bun and Klaassen (2007) and Qureshi and Tsangarides (2011)
in applying a dynamic approach, and adds to this literature by showing that dynamics
can explain the time series impact of currency unions on trade for the entire GR (2002)
sample.
This paper also differentiates itself from other CU papers considering dynamics by
drawing upon the intuition of many economists that there are other omitted variables,
as monetary unions are generally meant to be forever and so are unlikely to come apart
for trivial reasons. In Thom and Walsh’s (2002) case study of the UK-Ireland CU dis-
solution, the authors mention that all five of Portugal’s former colonies ended their
common currencies after a coup d’etat in Portugal and wars of independence followed
by civil wars and communist takeovers, and that several of France’s colonies also dis-
solved their currencies at the denouement of bitter struggles for independence. For these
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examples, the CU dissolution was unlikely to have been the main reason trade subse-
quently declined, yet including country-pair time trends, the method Bun and Klassen
(2007) employed, would be a necessary but not sufficiently appropriate control, which
may have lead them to find that currency unions increase trade by a still sizeable 25%,
and precisely estimated.
Hence, instead of limiting the sample like other researchers have done in order to
reduce the magnitude of the impact, I collected more data, researching each of the
CU entrances and exits in search of omitted variables. The multifarious causes of CU
breakups include warfare, communist takeovers, coup d’etats, geopolitical strife, ethnic
cleansing, anti-foreigner rioting, bloody wars of independence, genocide, financial crises,
currency crises, severe recessions, and, in addition, CU breakups are strongly correlated
with unavailable trade or GDP data and often follow on the heels of equally suspicious
trade collapses. And factors such as the gradual trade decline associated with the history
of decolonization yielded an interesting insight – that the true gravity relationship is
dynamic.
Of the 97 non-colonial country pairs with currency union entrances and exits in the GR
(2002) sample, only 73 are left after removing pairs with missing data immediately before
or after a currency union entrance or dissolution, and only 55 remain after removing
those in which currency unions dissolved at the same time as war broke out or one of
the countries in the pair experienced a cataclysmic geopolitical event, such as ethnic
cleansing of those who share a common currency. Seventeen of the these dissolutions
followed dramatic trade declines, and most of the rest followed recessions (bilateral GDP
had fallen in 42 out of 55 cases), yet on average were not followed by trade declines. And
there are arguably few or even no clearcut examples where the timing of a trade decline
supports the hypothesis that a currency union dissolution caused a sizable decline in
trade, while there are dozens of clear counterexamples.
The conclusion is not, however, that currency unions do not tend to promote trade.
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There is a good case to be made that common currencies can moderately reduce the
nuisance of international trade and travel, and logic would follow that this would be likely
to increase trade – yet it also seems unlikely that currency would be a deciding factor
for where to go on holiday or materially alter the number of Volkswagens sold in France.
I estimate an impact of CUs on trade close to zero, yet with relatively imprecise error
bounds. While other studies have found estimates which lack statistical significance,
these studies were either for earlier or later time periods, or divided the GR (2002)
sample in some way. For example, Bomberger (2003) examined decolonization, Klein
(2002) investigated dollarization, Nitsch (2005) looked at currency union entrances, and
Pakko and Wall (2001) predated GR’s (2002) time series estimates of currency unions
on trade and used a smaller dataset. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
paper which demonstrates that properly accounting for decolonization and other omitted
variables can convincingly explain the puzzling large size of the earlier result, although
many papers have succeeded at least in reducing the size of the impact or increasing the
error bounds.
Aside from the straightforward policy implications of the central finding, the lesson
that history matters and therefore that the gravity equation is dynamic has wide applica-
bility. The importance of dynamics are consistent with the results of Nitsch (2008), who
used a simple time trend to remove the Euro’s trade impact. It can also be interpreted
as being consistent with the findings of Bergin and Lin (2010), who found gradually
increasing trade intensity in the Eurozone predating the Euro, although the authors
interpret this result as indicating that lower expected future trade costs increased trade
even before the Euro’s inception.
The central result is also consistent with Klein and Shambaugh’s (2006) finding that
while direct pegs increase trade substantially, the estimated impact is less than for
currency unions, and that indirect pegs do not increase trade at all. One interpretation
of this result is that indirect pegs are more likely to be random, and less likely to suffer
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from the same degree of endogeneity and omitted variables bias as are direct pegs,
which in turn are likely to suffer less from endogeneity bias as currency unions, since
a peg is easier to change. In a clever working paper, Baranga (2011) argues that the
adoption of the Euro affords a similar natural experiment, since countries that previously
endogenously pegged to a Euro member then found themselves randomly pegged to the
other Euro members, and finds no effect of this random peg. While it may be argued
that currency unions and direct pegs are seen as more permanent than indirect pegs, the
difference in the point estimates is large—Klein and Shambaugh find an impact of 21%
for direct pegs versus -1.4% for indirect pegs. That this difference could be reconciled
based on expectations of the permanence of the type of peg is not credible given Klein
and Shambaugh’s other finding—that exchange rate volatility itself is hardly correlated
with trade, as going from normal exchange rate volatility to no volatility at all implies
an increase in trade of just one or two percent.
The central finding in this paper, that currency unions are not significantly correlated
with higher trade flows when we incorporate dynamics, is also consistent with earlier
findings on the gold standard era by Meissner and Lopez-Cordova (2003). In the period
before World War II, there was a strong cross-sectional correlation between trade and
sharing a currency, but the results were no longer significant when fixed effects were
included (to correct for reverse causality, Baldwin and Taglioni’s [2006] “gold metal
error”), with the measured impact less than the standard error.
The basic insight for why dynamic estimates can yield such differing results can be seen
in the graph below comparing the UK’s trade with all of its colonies to those countries
with which it started the period sharing a currency union (most of these countries exited
during the Sterling crisis in the 1960s). The graph is a plot of the coefficients from a
simple panel gravity regression with country-pair fixed effects and with a separate UK
colony and UK currency union dummy for each year for the sample in GR (2002).
It is readily apparent that the path of trade between the UK and countries with CU
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dissolutions, all but one of which were former colonies, did not differ significantly from
colonies which were never involved in currency unions. Hence, including a simple time
trend specific to all UK colonial pairs eliminates the result (regression results in Table
1 in the next section).
To get a flavor for how omitted variables can bias the estimates, the graph below
shows the trade relationship for India and Pakistan, which experienced one of the 134
dissolutions in the GR (2002) sample in 1966, and one of 26 which dissolved their
currency at the same time as a war broke out. However, the CU dissolution (vertical
blue line in chart) occurred at the same time as the outbreak of a brutal border war
in 1965, in what was not an unrelated event. Trade as a share of GDP was depressed
for years and never fully recovered, while hostilities between the two countries continue.
Another example is Tanzania and Uganda, which ended their CU amid the Liberation
War resulting in the overthrow of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.6
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Aside from warfare, there are a multitude of other omitted variables. Madagascar and
Reunion, below, experienced a dramatic trade decline after dissolving their currency
union in 1976, the same year that there were widespread anti-islander riots in Madagas-
car, when at least 1,400 Comorians were killed in Mahajanga.7 Thus, interpreting the
subsequent trade decline as due solely to the end of the CU is problematic. India and
Bangladesh ended their currency union in the wake of Operation Searchlight and the
1971 Bangladesh atrocities in which roughly 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took
refuge in India to escape genocide.8
Another major issue with the original GR (2002) sample is missing data. There are
numerous instances of currency unions dissolving and then no trade being recorded at
all until a number of years later. For example, Guinea and Mauritania had just one year
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of data recorded in 1968, when they were joined in a CU, but then have no recorded data
from 1969 to 1986 – nearly two decades – after which trade was substantially reduced.
While this might still be an example for the currency union effect, one cannot help but
suspect that whatever caused the data to be missing might be related to the decision
not to continue sharing a common currency. We should like the result to be robust to
the exclusion of examples such as this.
The importance of taking a time-series approach can also be seen from examples
where currency union dissolutions followed on the heels of dramatic trade collapses,
such as Madagascar and Niger below. In this case, inserting a simple dummy variable
for currency union could be misleading as trade was on average much larger before the
1981 dissolution than after, but the timing of the trade decline does not fit the conclusion
that the currency union dissolution had anything to do with it. For many of the cases
where trade as a share of GDP was on average lower after dissolution, the timing of the
trade declines is suspicious.
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Indeed, while there are numerous counterexamples (Madagascar-Niger above is one),
there are few, if any, clear examples which support the proposition that CUs substantially
increase trade. Since there are only 134 switches, it is not difficult to simply scan
the plots of each of the entrances and exits and ascertain in how many cases trade
collapses coincided with CU dissolutions. Of the 55 CU changes not associated with
decolonization, warfare, or missing data, there are roughly 40-45 counterexamples, 10-
15 ambiguous cases, and arguably just four examples for. While many of these are
debatable, the point estimate of the baseline regression in GR (2002) was 13 standard
deviations above zero. This implies that out of 134 CU switches, if the standard errors
are correct, there should not be any examples where a trade share remains constant
following a CU dissolution, much less increase.
Here are eight samples of the roughly 40 counterexamples out of the 55 CU changes
not associated with decolonization, warfare, or missing data.
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By contrast, the four most promising examples (below) I could find which appear
to be supportive point toward the conclusion that there could be still more omitted
variables. Of the four, none have complete post-war data, or even data for three years
on either side of a CU change. Three out of the four dissolutions here also coincided
with recessions, and the change in CU status in the Cameroon case hinged on the results
of the Civil War which took place in 1984 and likely depressed trade in that year, which
would be an argument for why, if it were feasible, we would want to include country-year
dummies as well. Lastly, for two of these four “examples” ostensibly in support of the
theory that currency unions have a large impact on trade, trade as a share of GDP
eventually recovered.
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Yet, while classifying examples and counter-examples in this manner is illuminating,
it also carries an element of subjectivity, and is less convincing than proper regression
results, which we will get to after modelling the dynamic nature of trade in the next
section.
1 Modeling Dynamic Gravity
As stressed by Krugman and Helpman (1985), trade is a dynamic process. Most New
Trade Theory models (e.g., Krugman 1979) include fixed costs, which Feenstra (2003)
uses to motivate gravity. Once the fixed costs are paid, they tend to become sunk, and
therefore imply that gravity might have important dynamics. And even a Heckscher-
Ohlin model would imply that trade patterns are persistent if endowments evolve slowly.
Examples of key papers which imply that trade should be a function of lagged trade
costs include Krugman (1987), Baldwin (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Feen-
stra and Kee (2008) and Melitz (2003), the last two of which assume a market-specific
fixed cost of entry. When trade costs change, those costs become sunk, while trade
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costs themselves are likely to be autocorrelated. Empirically, trade patterns are highly
persistent, as shown by Eichengreen and Irwin (2003), and in a recent working paper,
Campbell (2010) shows that a dynamic gravity equation can arise out of a simple model
of habit persistence in consumer tastes or in market-specific learning-by-doing or fixed
costs, and finds that trade patterns and shocks are highly persistent, even across cen-
turies. Many other recent papers study trade dynamics, including Jung (2009), Yotov
and Olivero (2010), Horsewood, Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann (2006), Bun and
Klaassen (2002), Agosin, Alvarez, and Bravo-Ortega (2011), Egger (2001) and Qureshi
and Tsangarides (2011), all of whom find that dynamics matter.
Equation (1) below is a very simple dynamic econometric model which emerges out
of Campbell (2010), and is general enough that it encompasses any potential dynamic
model, although which terms are relevant is an empirical question.
(1) A(L)Xijt = B(L)τijt + C(L)ijt
A(L), B(L), and C(L) are lag polynomials, Xijt is the log of trade over GDP, τijt are
trade costs and proxies for trade costs, including the usual geographic gravity controls,
ijt are the error terms, and A(L) is invertible. Given that tariff and regulatory policy are
highly persistent but not exactly known, shocks to trade are likely to be autocorrelated,
which is the motivation for including C(L). The B(L) might represent potential J-
curve type effects, where it may take agents time to react to unanticipated changes in
trade costs, and hence lagged trade costs would be affecting current trade through a
mechanism other than lagged trade (although my own intuition is that this term may be
the least important of the three). Note that this model is general enough that it includes
the “static” gravity case if the empirics dictate that the lagged variables do not matter.
However, in practice, studies which examine dynamics in trade generally find that trade
exhibits an AR(p) process of some order. Inverting this process yields a dynamic gravity
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equation:
(2) Xijt = A(L)−1B(L)τijt +A(L)−1C(L)ijt
This can be rewritten as:
(3) Xijt = D(L)τijt + E(L)ijt
Where D(L) and E(L) are lag polynomials of infinite order. Equation (3) says that
trade shares today depend on trade costs and shocks, past and present. Estimating this
equation instead of a static equation can have a dramatic impact on our estimates of the
impacts of currency unions on trade, and, just as importantly, on the measured standard
errors. Glick and Rose (2002) estimated:
(4) ln(Xijt) = β0 + αij + β1ln(YitYjt) + β2ln(yityjt) + β3CUijt + ijt
Where the Yit is GDP, the lower-case yit is GDP per capita, the dependent variable
is now the log of the sum of bilateral trade, αij are time-invariant fixed effects, and ijt
are assumed to be i.i.d. shocks. There are three potential problems with estimating
(4) instead of (3). The first is that the ijt will not be i.i.d. in a world where trade
follows an AR process. In practice, autocorrelated errors are a common feature of panel
data. The second is that the impact of currency unions on trade should grow over time,
which implies that using a simple dummy might understate the absolute value of the
long-run effect as it is averaged with the short-term effects which should theoretically
be lower. Thirdly, while putting in time-invariant fixed effects seems harmless enough,
those fixed effects are likely to include factors which evolve in a particular way, which
may be autocorrelated. Indeed, Bun and Klassen (2007) shrink the impact of currency
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unions on trade by including country-pair-specific trends. I will first propose something
even less obtrusive: that we allow the coefficient on colonization to trend, reflecting the
fact that colonial trade relationships have been observed to decay over time as noted in
Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010), and estimate the following “dynamic” gravity relationship
instead:
(5) ln(Xijt) = β0+αij+β1ln(YitYjt)+β2ln(yityjt)+β3CUijt+β4Colonyij ∗year+ijt
Where we are comfortable assuming that E[ijtist] = 0, but that we need to clus-
ter at the country-pair level to get standard error estimates robust to autocorrelation
(Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan [2004] suggest this for difference-in-difference estimates),
so that we do not require that E[ijtij(t−k)] = 0, ∀k.9
2 Empirics
The impact of the dissolution of UK currency unions is then estimated using the two
approaches, the “static” equation in (4) and the “dynamic” equation in (5), with the
results below in Table 1. The bilateral trade data come from the IMF’s Direction of
Trade (DOT) database for 217 countries from 1948 to 1997, by way of GR’s [2002] data,
but with many gaps. In the “static” formulation of gravity, our estimate of the impact
of UK currency unions on trade is exp(.731)-1 which implies that currency unions more
than double trade. Including a simple colony-year interaction—a very mild control—
yields a point estimate close to zero, yet with sizable clustered standard errors.10 Also,
GDP and GDP per capita are both included as controls with an eye toward replicating
Glick and Rose (2002), but the results are not sensitive to removing GDP per capita
from the regression (and the same holds true for later regressions in this paper).
14
Table 1
Country-Pair FE “Static” Gravity “Dynamic” Gravity
UK Currency Unions 0.734* -0.042
(0.110) (0.146)
UK Colonial Pair-Year -0.038*
Trend Interaction (0.003)
Log Real GDP 0.042* 0.043*
(0.009) (0.009)
Log Real GDP per capita 0.808* 0.811*
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant -4.904* -4.286*
(0.228) (0.232)
Observations 219,558 219,558
Number of pairid 11,178 11,178
R-squared 0.116 0.117
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%;
Data from Glick and Rose (2002).
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The results above for UK colonial pairs motivate the series of dynamic controls below
in Table 2 on the full sample of currency union changes. The first row replicates the
baseline result in GR (2002), which implies that CUs nearly double trade, with the other
controls, such as GDP, GDP per capita, and the country-pair fixed effects suppressed.
When the errors are clustered for this regression at the country-pair level, the estimated
errors more than double. The second estimate includes a year fixed effect, which is a
standard gravity control and is necessary because some shocks might affect all trade
adversely in particular years, such as the oil shocks in the 1970s. The third row includes
a UK Colony and year trend interaction, the same control in Table 1 above, which yields
an implied impact of CUs on trade of just 58%. Yet, this result is driven by the CU
changes due to wars or ethnic rioting, as if we remove those from the sample, the point
estimate falls to just a 24% increase, and no longer significant at 5% (still including year
FE and a UK colony and year trend interaction). This point estimate, in turn, is driven
by the examples where a CU change is followed by missing data, as removing these
examples shrinks the impact to just 16%, and not statistically significant. Finally, in the
last row, a trend term for each country-pair is included in the estimation: ln(Xijt) =
β0+αij+
∑
t Y eart+β1ln(YitYjt)+β2ln(yityjt)+β3CUijt+
∑
i
∑
j β4ij(αij ∗Y ear)+ijt.
The point estimate for the impact of currency unions on trade for this regression is now
less than zero, although imprecisely estimated, with good reason to believe that the
errors might still be biased downward since the assumption that E[ijtikt] = 0 is not
likely to hold in practice, even with country-pair FE included.
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Table 2
Estimates of CU on Trade
Baseline Result .654*
(Normal SEs) (0.044)
(Clustered SEs) (0.111)
Include Year Fixed Effects .584*
(Clustered SEs) (0.109)
Include UK Colony*Year Trend .457*
(Clustered SEs) (0.120)
Eliminate Wars and Riots .218***
(Clustered SEs) (0.117)
Eliminate Missing Data .151
(Clustered SEs) (0.103)
Allow Country-Pair Trade to trend -0.012
(Clustered SEs) (0.089)
* Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 10%. All regressions include
country-pair fixed effects, lrgdp, and and lrgdppc as controls.
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To see that the OLS standard errors in a panel gravity setting do indeed exhibit
autocorrelation, and thus need to be clustered, below I have reported the autocorrelation
coefficients at various lags in the errors for the first regression in Table 2. This is evidence
that at least some of the lagged terms in the dynamic gravity equation are empirically
relevant.
lag # Autocorrelation in Errors from
Baseline Specification (1st row) in Table 1:
1 0.561
2 0.411
3 0.319
4 0.238
5 0.174
6 0.114
7 0.056
8 0.007
9 -0.041
There are alternative dynamic estimation approaches to the last row in Table 2. One
option would be to use a lagged dependent variable, and then to use an Arellano-Bond
or Blundell-Bond type of fix to correct for Nickel Bias.11 Another simple alternative is
a difference-in-difference estimate, running gravity in log changes—regressing the log
change in trade on the log change in GDP and a CU dummy for the full sample with
country-pair fixed effects. In the results below in the second column of Table 3, the point
estimate on a CU Dummy is negative but insignificant, implying that countries which
leave CUs do not experience faster trade declines after dissolution.12 These results stand
in stark contrast to the “Static” gravity equation estimated in levels, with Country-Pair
Fixed Effects in the first column below.
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Table 3
Country-Pair FE “Static” Gravity “Dynamic” Gravity
Currency Union 0.725* -0.015
(0.045) (0.041)
LRGDP / ∂LRGDP 0.516* 0.389*
(0.003) (0.018)
Observations 218,087 195,183
Pairid 11,077 9,571
R-squared 0.4718 0.0026
“Dynamic” Gravity here is in Log Changes, “Static” Gravity in Levels.
* significant at 1%; Data from GR (2002).
The results in Tables 2 and 3 imply that the impact of currency unions on trade can
actually be eliminated in a number of ways—with a simple dynamic specification as in
Table 3, or by controlling for omitted variables and estimating correct standard errors
as in Table 2.
Yet, one of the implications of dynamic gravity is that the maximal impact of a
change in trade costs could take years. Hence, treating each year after a dissolution as
being the same could bias the estimate of the overall impact downward. An additional
robustness check, then, is to estimate the impact of CUs on trade by year before and
after dissolution. When we plot this with 90% error bounds for the baseline regression
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with Year FE (2nd regression in Table 2 above), one can see, first, that substantial trade
declines precipitated dissolution. Secondly, compared with the last year in a CU, the
decline in trade was only borderline significant in three individual years.13
When we include the same controls as in the last row of Table 2 (including time
trends and excluding wars and CUs with missing data), the estimates of the impact of
dissolution hovers about zero, with standard errors large enough that a large positive
(or negative) impact of currency unions on trade is possible. This implies that the
declining trade intensity before dissolution was a result of endogeneity rather than the
expectations of higher future trade costs inducing a decline in trade.14
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3 Conclusion
The results presented here reconcile the puzzling large apparent impact of currency
unions on trade for the Glick and Rose (2002) sample with the much smaller and often
statistically insignificant results of the Euro, with Klein and Shambaugh’s findings on
indirect pegs and exchange rate volatility, and with Meissner and Lopez-Cordova’s time
series results on the gold standard era. The early large, and precisely estimated results
from the post-war period were driven by those examples of CU breakups coterminous
with warfare, communist takeovers, coup d’etats, geopolitical strife, decolonization, and
various other calamities likely to have adversely affected trade, and are sensitive to
dynamic specifications. Given that the best point estimate of currency unions on trade
is not statistically different from zero for all time periods, countries weighing their options
on whether or not to join or leave a currency union, such as the decision Greece faces
at the time of writing, would do well to discount previous evidence that there is a large
trade channel in their calculations.
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Footnotes
1. Indeed, Jeff Frankel has called Rose’s results on currency unions the most significant
finding in International Macro in the past ten years, and Baldwin reports that Ken Rogoff
assigned his Harvard students a “search and destroy” mission to try and discover what
was causing the Rose results.
2. Other informative recent examples of this growing and active literature in-
clude Qureshi and Tsangarides (2010, 2011), Chen, Mirestean, and Tsangarides (2011),
Baranga (2011), Katayama and Melatos (2011), and Dorn and Egger (2011).
3. These include Kelejian, Tavlas, and Petroulas (2011), who find a borderline effect,
Baranga (2011), which finds none, and Escalona and Gomez (2011), who find a gradually
increasing trade intensity in the Eurozone predating the Euro.
26
4. For example, possibly because of electronic transactions, traveller’s checks peaked
in the mid-1990s and are now on a sharp downward spiral:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TVCKSSL.
5. In the abstract to Rose’s response to Persson’s critique, he writes “I have always
maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly
large...”
6. “An Idi-otic Invasion.” TIME magazine, Nov. 13, 1978.
7. Madagascar: A Short History, by Randrianja and Ellis, 2009, University of Chicago
Press.
8. "Bangladesh: Bringing a Forgotten Genocide to Justice" by Ishaan Tharoor in Time
Magazine, Aug. 03, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2008085,00.html.
9. Of course, even with country-pair fixed effects, the assumption that E[ijtikt] = 0
is also problematic – I thank Colin Cameron for pointing this out. Unfortunately, using
country-year fixed effects for this dataset, even for only countries with CU switches,
requires more computing power than I have access to.
10. An alternative would be to use Newey-West standard errors, which also correct
for autocorrelation in the error terms, but could not be used on the full sample using
Stata due to matsize limitations. On a reduced sample, the clustered errors and the
Newey-West errors yield similar results. Another alternative would be to use panel-
corrected standard errors – xtpcse in Stata – which also corrects for autocorrelation.
Unfortunately, the general version of this command requires the years to be the same
without gaps, and the panel-specific version runs into the same matsize issues as trying
to run the Newey-West command. Hence, clustering at the country-pair level is the best
choice for this dataset.
11. The existence of a sizable impact of CUs on trade is also sensitive to using
Arellano-Bond type dynamic estimators. Arellano-Bond with the UK-Colony year trend
included yields an estimate of 0.075 with a SE of (0.127). Arellano-Bond with trends
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for all CU pairs yields a negative, insignificant estimate of CUs on trade, and various
Blundell-Bond specifications yield similar results (see the authors homepage for further
information).
12. I.e., the “Dynamic” equation in Table 2 estimates: ln(Xijt) − ln(X(ijt−1)) =
β0 + αij + β1(ln(YitYjt)− ln(Y(it−1)Y(jt−1))) + β3CUijt + ijt.
13. This regression uses equation (4) : ln(Xijt) = β0+αij+β1ln(YitYjt)+β2ln(yityjt)+
β3CUijt + ijt, with the only difference that the CU dummy is broken up by year.
14. This regression uses the equation: ln(Xijt) = β0+αij+
∑
t Y eart+β1ln(YitYjt)+
β2ln(yityjt) + β3CUijt +
∑
i
∑
j β4ij(αij ∗ Y ear) + ijt.
Appendix A: List of Switches Coterminous with Warfare, Ethnic Cleansing, or Com-
munist Takeovers
1. Tanzania-Uganda
2. Mauritania-Niger
3. Mauritania-Senegal
4. Mauritania-Togo
5. Kenya-Tanzania
6. Kenya-Uganda
7. Madagascar-Reunion
8. Madagascar-Senegal
9. Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)-Mali
10. Bangladesh-India
11. Burma(Myanmar)-India
12. Burma(Myanmar)-Pakistan
13. Sri Lanka-India
14. Sri Lanka-Pakistan
15. India-Pakistan
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16. India-Mauritius
17. Pakistan-Mauritius
18. France-Algeria
19. France-Morocco
20. France-Tunisia
21. Portugal-Angola
22. Portugal-Cape Verde
23. Portugal-Guinea-Bissau
24. Portugal-Mozambique
25. Portugal-São Tomé and Príncipe
26. United Kingdom-Zimbabwe
Appendix B: List of Switches Coterminous with Missing Data
1. Cameroon-Mauritania
2. Central African Republic-Madagascar
3. Central African Republic-Mali
4. Chad-Madagascar
5. Republic of Congo-Madagascar
6. Benin-Guinea
7. Benin-Madagascar
8. Benin-Mauritania
9. Gabon-Guinea
10. Gabon-Madagascar
11. Guinea-Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
12. Guinea-Mauritania
13. Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)-Mauritania
14. Madagascar-Niger
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15. Madagascar-Togo
16. Madagascar-Burkina Faso
17. Mauritania-Niger
18. Mauritania-Togo
19. Cameroon-Comoros
20. Cameroon-Guinea-Bissau
21. Benin-Reunion
22. Gabon-Mali
23. Madagascar-Mauritania
24. Reunion-Senegal
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